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Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) [46] is an ex-
tension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose
and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population
structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment
and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found
within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous popula-
tion of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies
within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations
and their evolution are examined.
1 Introduction
Social interactions are often characterized by the preferential selection of partners. An
obvious example is the selection of sexual partners, but there are many others. Researchers
carefully choose collaborators. Salmon shermen in southeast Alaska share information
about salmon locations within small, carefully chosen groups, where the payos for receiving
but not giving true information are high [17]. Male guppies choose partners for predator
inspection [10, 11]. Food sharing between families may have been one of the major forces
leading to village formation in the American southwest [31].
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Preferential partner selection occurs partly because it helps minimize risks associated
with defection. Sexual partners may pass diseases, lower social status, provide poor genes
to ospring, or opt out of child rearing. For salmon shermen, the cost of sharing with
untrustworthy individuals is the loss of valuable sh, and so any individuals who betray
that trust are eliminated from the group. Guppies are less willing to interact with guppies
who have previously defected by hanging back during predator inspection; a guppy whose
partner hangs back is in much greater danger of being eaten. Friends may defect by passing
on sensitive information, missing meetings, and many other ways. Orbell and Dawes [41]
argue that, since cooperation helps increase total accumulated wealth, and partner selection
enhances cooperation, it is to the benet of society as a whole to evolve social structures
which allow individuals to choose their partners.
Partner selection creates social networks of interacting individuals which are pathways
for the transmission of diseases, information, and cultural traits. Networks of sexual contacts
determine the paths along which a sexually transmitted disease, such as AIDS, can spread,
and modelers have shown that dierent network structures can lead to vastly dierent AIDS
epidemics [32]. For various sorts of cooperative behavior, the detailed sociology of who
chooses whom and why is a fundamental question about societies. How do groups form?
What bonds them? What role to do key individuals play in the society? Social networks
link local social interactions to global societal properties.
Social networks and combinatorial graph theory give a framework for the study of social
interactions. Social networks have been an area of research in sociology since the late seven-
ties [25, 33, 9, 47] and have recently come under active investigation by AIDS researchers [32].
Knoke [30] presents a good, brief introduction to social networks. Pollock [42] has discussed
social nets in the context of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, limiting his discussion to cer-
tain behaviors, and Holland [24] has claimed that networks are an essential ingredient of
complex adaptive systems.
In a bottom up approach, we have used the Prisoner's Dilemma as a platform from which
to begin studying the connections between local social interactions among individuals, their
social network structures, and the global properties which result from these local behaviors.
To our knowledge this is the one of the initial applications of the techniques of social networks
to complex adaptive systems. In section 1.3 we discuss related Prisoner's Dilemma computer
simulation research on population structure.
1.1 Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game that allows the study of interaction among selsh agents.
In Prisoner's Dilemma, two players can make one of simultaneous two moves { cooperate or
defect. If both players cooperate, they each get a payo of C, and if they both defect they
each get a payo of D. If one player defects and the other player cooperates, the defector
gets the highest payo, H, and the cooperator gets the lowest payo, L. The payos obey
the relations L < D < C < H and (H + L)=2 < C. Figure 1 is the payo matrix for
this paper. In Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma two players repeatedly play each other. The
restriction on the payos, (H +L)=2 < C, prevents two Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma players
from obtaining an average payo greater than cooperation by alternating cooperation and
defection. When this condition does not hold, a relationship Angeline [1] termed non-mutual
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Figure 1: Player A receives the payo on the right side of the comma, and player B gets
the payo of the left side of the comma. L < D < C < H and (H + L)=2 < C and L = 0,
D = 1, C = 3, H = 5.
cooperation gives higher scores than mutual cooperation. In most of this paper we use a
standard Prisoner's Dilemma payo matrix, but in section 8 we briey explore non-mutual
cooperation for IPD/CR.
The best move to make when playing a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is to defect. A
defection guarantees a payo of either D or H of which both are better than the L payo
which is possible if one decides to cooperate. But if both players defect, then they both will
do worse than if they both cooperate, and hence the dilemma. Defection makes sense when
only playing one game with one opponent. When the Prisoner's Dilemma game is repeated,
and the number of iterations is unknown to the players, then cooperation has a chance of
arising. This is only true if the players hope to maximize their total summed payos and not
simply beat a single opponent by obtaining a higher total score, for defection on all moves
is still the best strategy if they hope to simply conquer.
In a population undergoing coevolution, an individual wants to obtain a higher average
payo than the other individuals in the population in order to survive and reproduce. An
individual which scores higher than its opponents by defecting in each of its pairwise matches
is not guaranteed the highest average payo in the population, for if its opponents are able
to cooperate among themselves, and at least some of them defect against it sometimes, they
may be able to obtain higher average payos. On the other hand, if cooperators are not able
to minimize their losses or punish a defector, then the defector can invade a population.
Axelrod pioneered the use of computers for studying the evolution of cooperation and
developed a theory of cooperation based upon reciprocity from the round robin computer
tournaments he conducted [3]. Axelrod was the rst to use a genetic algorithm to evolve
complex strategies to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [4, 5], and soon after that Fujiki
and Dickinson implemented a system that evolved LISP coded strategies to play the Iter-
ated Prisoner's Dilemma [16]. Miller used a genetic algorithm to coevolve populations of
nite state machines [38] which played round robin tournaments of the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma with varying amounts of noise, where noise meant that with a certain probabil-
ity an individual's actions were misinterpreted by his partner/opponent. Miller found that
a coevolving population's average tness would initially take a dip as nasty players elimi-
nated naive cooperators, but with time players capable cooperating among themselves and
punishing defectors would evolve and take over the population { evolution of cooperation.
Fogel [13] has also evolved populations of automata that play the Iterated Prisoner's
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Dilemma using the technique of evolutionary programming [12, 15] and studied the eects
of modifying the payo matrix while still maintaining the proper relations of the payos.
Marks [37] discusses and reviews the use of automata in repeated games including the work
he has done on Prisoner's Dilemma with genetic algorithms. Further reviews of Prisoner's
Dilemma research can be found in [2, 7, 6, 36].
1.2 Previous Research
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is a model in which
agents may choose and refuse interactions based on expected payos from the other players
and thus allows the study of a more realistic but greatly more complicated system. Choice
allows defectors to home in on suckers while refusal allows the same suckers to protect them-
selves from repeated attack. Whereas in Axelrod's and Miller's experiments, reciprocation
of defection is necessary for the evolution of cooperation, in IPD/CR a population of players
who always cooperate can use choice and refusal to survive invasion by players who always
defect. While previous IPD/CR research [46, 2] has primarily focused on general trends
of many runs over dierent parameter settings, this paper will focus on examining what is
happening in specic populations to produce seemingly evolutionarily metastable results.
In the genetic algorithm work of Axelrod [5], often populations arose where the best
strategy was not a nice one. The strategy would use an initial defection and then begin
cooperation with like players. These strategies act as a sort of password system among the
players. Those players which know the password of \initial defect then cooperate" suer
minor losses compared to other players who don't. Players which don't use the password
will trigger, in a password using player, strategies which are often all defecting or Tit-for-Tat
while the password users end up in repeated mutual cooperation. Robson [44, 45] gives an
explanation of the evolution of these defect then cooperate strategies as \handshakes" and
Inman [27] talks about \insulars" \using a behavioral protocol based on a specic sequence
of cooperations and defections." We have also observed similar handshakes in plain Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma experiments and view this operation as an example of a constrained
system evolving an approximation to a choice and refusal mechanism. In IPD/CR, such
passwords do not seem to come into play as individuals rely upon the choice and refusal
mechanisms to obtain cooperation. Choice and refusal are important enough to a popu-
lation's stability that if some mechanism for choice and refusal is not provided, they may
spontaneously emerge during evolution.
The large number of iterations in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game relative to the
population size and memory capacity of agents in both Axelrod's and Miller's work allows
for cooperation to evolve without much trouble. In both Miller's and Axelrod's experiments,
players are forced to play an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game of either 150 or 151 iterations
respectively with every other player in a round robin tournament, and in Miller a player also
played itself. In real life people often have the ability to choose and refuse with whom to
interact, and because of this ability the time of interaction is not necessarily as great as
represented in Axelrod's and Miller's experiments. A fully cooperating IPD/CR population
can maintain long-term cooperation while having an average interaction length of only 10.2
iterations. Fogel [14] conducted an experiment which allowed individuals to evolve their
length of interaction. A longer mean interaction length for a population was often coupled
4
with a higher average tness but not always, for the coevolutionary dynamics of the Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma still play a very active role as they do in IPD/CR. The change in length
of interaction is only one consequence of adding choice and refusal to the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma, and other eects have been reported in [2, 46].
The IPD/CR simulations have shown to produce fairly distinct levels of evolutionarily
metastable behavior that show up visually in the graphs of the populations' average tness
versus generation, where an individual's tness is dened to be its average payo. The
dierent regions are characterized by the average number of defections per individual. While
these metastable behaviors are also observed in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma without choice
and refusal, choice and refusal greatly decreases the number of them that are observed, and
thus enhances the signicance of the ones that are observed. This tendency for IPD/CR
populations to cluster in average payo space is discussed in [2, 46].
1.3 Population Structure
Population structures describe the way in which a population of individuals interact with
one another. Researchers have tended to look at either spatial or behavioral structures.
Both types of structures can either emerge from or be imposed on the population. IPD/CR
produces emergent, behavioral structures that we characterize by social networks.
Spatial population structure tends to refer to how real populations are spread out in
one, two, or three dimensions. For example, one dimensional populations could exist along
a beach front, two dimensional structures often model simple plant populations and land
roving animals, and three dimensional structures can be found populations which live in
trees or the ocean. Spatial distribution has been hypothesized as a cause of speciation [49].
Behavioral structures describe the behavior between individuals in contrast to simply
considering the fact that two individuals separated by a great distance tend not to be able
to directly interact. Individuals can be spatially separated in human organizations but be
close in a behavioral structure. Take for example an employee who lives in Los Angeles but
takes his orders from his boss in New York City. The employee is close to his boss in a
behavioral structure that shows the hierarchy of command but is far away spatially.
Many researchers have studied the eects of limiting interactions between social agents
by imposing spatial structure on Prisoner's Dilemma populations. Muhlenbein studied the
evolution of cooperation in various population structures and demonstrated that cooperation
emerged sooner with an implementation based on Darwin's Continent Cycle than in other
population structures [39]. Axelrod studied the idea of clustering cooperators together so
that they can invade a population of defectors [3]. A commonly implemented spatial struc-
ture is a two dimensional cellular automata where each cell is a player, and that player's
interactions with the other members of the population is limited to either its four or eight
closest neighbors. Nowak and May ran Prisoner's Dilemma on a grid and produced inter-
esting patterns [40], but Huberman and Glance criticized Nowak and May's synchronous
updating of the cellular automata { in nature synchronous updating does not correspond to
reality { and showed that an asynchronous updating causes the patterns to disappear [26].
But Lindgren and Nordahl [34] investigated a grid based population more as an interest-
ing cellular automata than a real biological or social system and reported that interesting
patterns emerge with asynchronous updating of cells if the individuals have greater memory
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depths. These population structures say who may interact with whom.
In contrast to researcher imposed spatial population structures, behavioral structures
tend to be emergent properties of the social system, and it is up to the researcher to measure
who interacts with whom. Lindgren and Nordahl examined the formation of food webs
within a Prisoner's Dilemma simulation where individuals can use tags to determine who
to play. The tags act as a form of attractiveness [35]. Glance and Huberman have done
work on uidity of the population structure and have reported that allowing players to join
and leave clusters of others players aids in the formation of cooperation for the N-person
Prisoner's Dilemma [18]. While there is some similarity between our work and that of these
other two groups, in IPD/CR we are interested in who plays whom and not in who eats
whom, and the IPD/CR behavioral structure is not as constrained as that of Glance and
Huberman but instead is a measured property describing relationships that emerge from
individual behaviors.
Previous research which has addressed the issue of social choice with computer simula-
tions but to our knowledge has not looked at the issue from a structural viewpoint includes
Riolo [43], and Batali and Kitcher [8]. Riolo has done preliminary experiments with agents
who refuse partners based on players' tags. Batali and Kitcher present a simulation in which
agents receive a payo for opting out of games and while similar to IPD/CR, agents do not
choose and refuse social interactions as in IPD/CR, but simply get to decide when to quit
playing someone.
Kirman [28] talks about evolving networks of interactions between economic agents.
Kirman's idea is distinctly dierent than our approach here. We allow the network structures
to emerge naturally, but Kirman talks about the network structure evolving as a separate
entity which is operated on by some algorithm. The evolution of network structures has
been done in the articial neural network eld by several researchers [20, 29, 21]. With
neural networks, the search for a better topology makes much sense, but if one's goal is to
study natural systems then one doesn't want to search for the best connection of agents but
instead to study emergent structures.
2 IPD/CR
IPD/CR consists of a population of players which are coevolved over some number of gen-
erations using a genetic algorithm. Each generation is divided up into iterations. Unlike
traditional round robin implementations of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which each player
plays every other player each iteration, IPD/CR allows players to choose and refuse player
interactions at each iteration.
2.1 Choice and Refusal
The players in the IPD/CR simulations studied here consist of a sixteen state Moore machine
which is coded as a one hundred forty-eight bit string for use by the genetic algorithm as
in [38]. In Ashlock et. al [2] and Stanley et. al [46] we also used a Mealy machine formulation
and have found that the behavior of IPD/CR is not terribly sensitive to this representation
issue. The Moore machine is used to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and is the only
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part of the player structure which evolves. A player n maintains an expected payo (mjn)
of every other player m. (mjn) is used to determine who is best to play in the current
iteration and who is intolerable. Another player m is intolerable if (mjn) <  where  is
the minimum tolerance level. Expected payos for the entire population are initialized to

0
.
Every iteration, each player makes at most K oers of game play to the players from
whom it expects to obtain the highest payos. In other words, a player chooses the players
which correspond to the top K expected payos. If more than one player has the same
expected payo, random draws break the ties until K oers are made. If there are less than
K tolerable players to choose from then all tolerable players are chosen. If all other players
are considered intolerable by a player, then that player receives a wallower payo W .
For each chosen opponent, a Prisoner's Dilemma game is played between the player and
the opponent if the opponent does not refuse the oer of play. If the opponent had also
chosen the chooser, only one game is played between the pair and not two. If a player's oer
of play is rejected, that player receives a rejection payo R from the rejector, and the rejector
is not penalized. The rejector does not receive a payo from the chooser. If a Prisoner's
Dilemma game was played, each of the two players receives either a L, D, C, or H payo
as determined by the rules of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in section 1.1, and each player
changes its Moore machine state accordingly. A player stores a unique Moore machine state
for every opponent.
When a player n receives a payo from an opponent m either by playing a Prisoner's
Dilemma game or by being rejected, n updates its expected payo of m via the following
assignment rule,
(mjn) !(mjn) + (1  !)U ;
where U denotes the payo n received from m and ! is the \memory" weight.
2.2 Evolution
A genetic algorithm [23, 19, 48] is used to coevolve the population of players. For this
experiment, each generation consists of one IPD/CR tournament. We used a population
size of thirty. At the moment, IPD/CR requires that each player remember what state it
is in with respect to all other players, and as it is common for humans to remember their
current feelings towards large numbers of people, this does not seem like a bad assumption.
A generation/tournament is over when the predetermined number of iterations has elapsed.
A player's tness is determined to be the average payo per payo it received. At the end of
a generation, the top twenty individuals as ranked by tness, the elite, are chosen to survive
to the next generation. Individuals of equal tness have equal probability of surviving. From
the twenty elite individuals, ten individuals are chosen with replacement via tness biased
selection to pair up, mate and ll up the ten openings with their children. An individual can
mate with itself. When two individuals mate, their bit strings are subjected to one point
crossover and the resulting two children are then subjected to mutation. The probability
of a single bit mutation for these experiments was set at 0.005. All individuals' memories
of previous plays are removed, so that their expected payos are reinitialized to 
0
= 3 for
the next generation, and their Moore machines are reinitialized to their starting states. The
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Figure 2: The left gure shows the average decrease in genetic diversity of the 100 runs in
this paper. The gure on the right shows ve example runs and their genetic diversity over
250 generations. Genetic diversity is dened to be the average of players' average hamming
distance to other players' bit strings.
Type of crossover One point 
0
(Initial expected payo) 3.0
Probability of crossover 1.0  (Minimum tolerance level) 1.6
Probability of a bit mutation 0.005 K (Maximum number of oers of play) 1
Number of iterations 150 R (Rejection payo) 1.0
Population size 30 W (Wallower payo) 1.6
Number of elite 20 ! (memory weight) 0.7
Table 1: The parameters for the populations examined in this report.
number of iterations per generation was set at one hundred fty.
Initial experiments have shown that while the specications of the genetic algorithm
aect the outcome of the experiments, the social network results of the experiments are gen-
eral over many parameter settings. When a successful mixture of players evolves, the genetic
algorithm quickly creates a population which is fairly homogeneous genetically. Figure 2
shows the decrease in genetic diversity for the runs in this paper. However, because of the
way the Moore machines are coded as bit strings, a single bit mutation can create an indi-
vidual which behaves drastically dierent from its parents, and thus the genetic algorithm
can create \invaders" of the semi-stable elite population. The dynamics of IPD/CR cause
the populations to maintain low average ages, two and a half to ve generations old. Low
average age of individuals implies that there is a constantly changing population, and this
allows for drift in unexpressed behavior.
Table 1 describes the IPD/CR environment examined in this paper. A study of other
IPD/CR parameter settings is reported in [2].
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3 Understanding Population Behaviors
Despite the simple formulation of IPD/CR, the population behavior which results is very
complex, and varies signicantly between runs with dierent random seeds. This complexity
is a desirable feature of the model, as it is with any articial life system which seeks to
capture some of the richness and variability of the real world. In order to understand such
a system, we need to examine it from a variety of perspectives. This is a new eld, and
tools for doing this research must be borrowed from other elds, or developed from scratch.
We have developed and appropriated a number of such tools. The results of the studies
presented here show that we need even better tools: we believe that most multiagent studies
will benet from some of the approaches we demonstrate.
To begin with, we can look at IPD/CR from a global perspective using the population
statistics of average payo, minimum payo, maximum payo, Hamming distance between
player's encoded bit strings, etc. Such a perspective can give general information but almost
always cannot say anything about why the population has such statistics. At the other ex-
treme, we can look at each individual's Moore machine. This local perspective tells us how
an individual is constructed and how it could interact with any other individual. However,
neither the global nor this myopic local perspective gives enough information for us to un-
derstand our system. An individual's expressed behavior depends upon the behavior of the
other individuals present in the population, and the global characteristics like average payo
mean little without understanding the local social interactions.
In IPD/CR, individuals choose their own interactions based on their opinion of other
individual players. These interactions build up networks of interacting players, and the
results of these interactions lead to the global statistics. Thus one of the most crucial aspects
of our simulations is the network structure, which is intermediate between the global and
the local. Techniques used in the theory of social networks help to bridge the gap between
global and local by using combinatorial graph theory to characterize the social interactions
in the population and provide a view of the whole.
We next describe our social network method, the signicant play graph, and then the
visualization system used to investigate IPD/CR populations.
3.1 Signicant Play Graph
A network or combinatorial graph [22], from now on referred to simply as a graph, is a useful
abstraction of social interactions. A graph consists of a set of vertices or nodes and a set of
edges. An edge connects two vertices. In terms of social networks, the vertices of the graph
represent individuals, and the edges represent some property such as friendship that the two
individuals share. Edges can also be assigned a weight. The edge weight can be used to
represent the strength of the property between two nodes.
Traditionally, social network research has dealt with directed graphs, digraphs, in which
a direction is placed on the edges. Digraphs would, for example, allow the study of ows,
and in a social sense, digraphs could show us that John likes Mary, but Mary doesn't like
John. However, digraphs add an extra layer of complexity, and we could not make use of
this information at this point in our studies. Therefore, for simplicity, we will use undirected
graphs in this paper, in which vertices are individuals, and edges represent signicant play
9
between two individuals.
The construction of the IPD/CR signicant play graph consists of several steps. First,
at the beginning of each generation, all of the edges of a complete graph (each node is
connected by an edge to every other node except itself) are given a weight of zero. When
two individuals play a game of Prisoner's Dilemma, the weight of the edge connecting the
two players' nodes is incremented by one. The maximum weight an edge can have is equal
to the number of iterations per generation, one hundred fty.
At the end of a generation, the distribution of edge weights can be plotted in a histogram
to show general population characteristics. A population in which the individuals randomly
play each other will have a bell-shaped distribution of edge weights with a mean of around
ten and a standard deviation of 3{4, but a population that contains members which have
strong preferences for a few specic members of the population will show a distribution
at the higher end of the spectrum with a second high peak of near zero weighted edges
between players that rarely interacted. While the distribution can show general population
characteristics, it does not show who played whom. To get a better understanding of what
is going on in a population, the edges of the play graph which do not represent signicant
levels of game activity are zeroed out and the other edges have their weights set equal to
one.
For purposes of the current analysis, an edge is considered signicant if it is greater than
a threshold value. If the standard deviation, , of the edge weights is greater than the mean
edge weight, , then the threshold is set equal to , otherwise the cuto is set equal to
   2, unless this causes the threshold to be negative in which case it is instead set equal
to one. After applying the computed threshold to the edge weights, the edges with a weight
of zero are considered to be deleted, and the remaining edges determine the signicant play
graph.
The determination of what represents signicant play is the key to obtaining useful
graphs. What appears to be a signicant connection depends in part on the population
being observed. We have tried a number of procedures, visually comparing the results to
the observed behavior of the individuals (see below in the visualization section). An obvious
choice is    2, but in populations that have great variation in edge weights, this choice
results in a negative threshold and a fully connected graph. On the other hand, setting
the threshold to , while eliminating this problem, cuts o too many connections in other
populations. Fixed thresholds, while they give nice results for specialized population types,
are not suciently general. The current, somewhat ad hoc, procedure was chosen so that
single contacts between individuals are usually not counted, and secondly when a signicant
portion of the edges are distributed together, forming a single mode, noisy and low weight
edges are set to zero, and thirdly when there is a bimodal distribution where the edges in
the lower mode are at reasonable levels some will be kept, but if they are very low they
will be cut o. This gives results which capture much of the structure seen in dynamic
visual observations, but more work needs to be done on this issue. Future plans include
the exploration of methods which favor interactions which occur later in the generation over
those which occur earlier, since we are interested in the long-term social network structures
which arise in populations. Interactions early in the generation are dictated by the agent's
attempts to learn about their environment and rarely reect long-term behavior.
The signicant graph measures of the average degree, maximum degree, and number of
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connected components can give insight to a population's behavior. The average degree and
maximum degree are calculated from the degrees of all of the nodes, where the degree of
a node is equal to the number of edges to which it is connected. A graph is connected
if all vertices are reachable by all other vertices via a path along the edges which connect
the vertices. If a graph is not connected, then it is composed of two or more connected
components, where each connected component, often referred to simply as a component, has
no edge connecting any of its vertices to any other connected component. The average degree
represents the average number of signicant relationships per individual. The maximum
degree can be used in combination with the average degree to discover populations with
central players who are more popular than other players. The number of components can
be used to identify populations in which players have clustered into separate groups, or
populations that have ostracized individuals, since an ostracized individual often forms its
own component.
3.2 Visualization
In a complex adaptive system like IPD/CR, visualization of simulations is crucial. Population
and signicant play graph statistics are sometimes misleading and dicult to interpret.
To validate and understand these results, we constructed a simple, interactive, real-time
animation.
In this paper we display two types of snapshots from the visualization system. The rst
is a snapshot of the animation which is an overlap of ve iterations of play and will be
discussed in detail below. The second is the nal display of the signicant play graph for a
generation.
The visualization works as follows. At the beginning of each generation, the twenty elite
individuals are placed, starting at \three o'clock," counterclockwise around a circle with
their rank in the previous generation determining their order. Completing the circle, the
ten children are then placed randomly into the remaining ten spots. During the animation,
an individual is represented by an open circle, an individual receiving a rejection payo is
represented by a square, and a wallower player is represented by a solid circle. Every indi-
vidual is connected to every other individual via an abstract damped spring. The dynamics
of the springs are aected by how often individuals play each other and the number of it-
erations elapsed. The spring strength becomes stronger between players which play each
other. When individuals get too close to each other, they are repelled via a force inversely
proportional to their separating distance. The overall eect of this system is to pull players
into clusters or bring out the features of central individuals by placing them in the center of
a group. Rejected players, now marked with a square, move away from the rejector. When
two players interact, because one of themmakes an oer to the other, a line is drawn between
them. When a player becomes a wallower, i.e. it nds all players intolerable, it turns into
a solid circle.
To ease visualization, we overlap ve iterations of a generation at a time onto the display.
The animation can be paused at any point, and then the researcher can use the mouse to
point and click on agents to get statistics on them and display their Moore machine structure.
One can also click on a pair of individuals and watch their pair play and expected payos
change over twenty iterations or until one nds the other intolerable. We have found that
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viewing the behavior an individual expresses with others is the most useful of these two
tools, as examining sixteen state Moore machines is tiresome and often gives little insight
into behavior within an individual's own population.
At the end of each generation, the individuals in the system are arranged back on their
starting circle, the individuals' tnesses are listed next to them, and the signicant play
graph is drawn. Note that at this point wallowers and rejectees are not given any special
designation.
4 Individual Behavior
One of the fundamental dogmas of articial life is the idea that local interactions among
autonomous objects can lead to global organization. As we detail later, organized population
structures do form and persist in IPD/CR, but in order to understand these organized
structures, we rst we need to look at the local interactions among IPD/CR agents which
create the population structures.
Individual behaviors in IPD/CR are most obviously determined by the choice and refusal
parameters, their Moore machines, and the structure of the choice and refusal procedure.
However, these things determine only the potential behavior of the individual in any popu-
lation. A player's actual behavior in a population is a product of the environment in which
it is placed. A group of players may all cooperate with each other, but if a mutant is placed
into their population, each one of them may react to that mutant in completely dierent
ways. The interconnections of IPD/CR are such that this one mutant could potentially
change other players' \feelings" about one another, and thus who ends up playing whom.
This would then change the social network structure of the population, and thus its global
properties.
Players' \feelings" to one another can be viewed as \liking" or \not minding" or \dis-
liking" another player. A player likes another player that has the highest expected payo.
Liking a player will cause the attracted player to choose the player it likes. A player does not
mind another player as long as that player has an expected payo greater than or equal to
the minimum tolerance level  . Not minding another player means that a player will accept
game oers from players it does not mind. A player dislikes another player if that player's
expected payo is less than  . If one dislikes another player, one will refuse game oers from
that player.
From these three \feelings," players form organized persistent social structures. The
sensitivity to their \feelings" which allows mutants to aect their behavior occurs because
the choice mechanism is nicky in the sense that if the expected payo from two dierent
players is very small, a player will always choose the player with the higher expected payo.
The players have no \fuzziness" in their selection. Hence, players may get stuck in the social
equivalent of a local optima.
In the following two sections we will describe a number of organized population structures
we have observed which can be described by the individual behaviors of which they are
composed (see Table 2).
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Full Nice Cooperation Everyone likes one another.
Latching Individuals like only a few other individuals, but don't mind the
others.
Raquel and the Bobs Bobs like all Raquels. Raquels like each other and don't mind
Bobs.
Stars Hubs dislike one another. Spokes like hubs. Hubs don't mind
spokes and like the spokes they are connected to in sequence.
Connected Centers Nice guys like each other and don't mind the thugs. Thugs like
and latch onto a center nice guy.
Wallower Everyone dislikes one another.
Table 2: A summary of the population behaviors described in sections 5 and 6 in terms of the
individual behaviors which act to give the populations their characteristic social networks.
The terminology is dened in the relevant subsections of sections 5 and 6.
5 Population Behaviors
A large number of population structures occur in IPD/CR. Generally no single behavior
emerges and persists forever, indicating that populations which are stable against mutation
and crossover probably don't exist. However, there do appear to be general population
structures which can be thought of as metastable in the sense that they emerge frequently
and persist for many generations. We will dene and describe ve of these population
structures in detail below: full nice cooperation, latching, Raquel and the Bobs (R&B),
stars, and connected centers. These populations, each of which we have repeatedly observed
for the environment discussed in this paper, distinguish themselves as organized and often
persistent over many generations.
The IPD/CR populations often make rapid transitions from one of these metastable
behaviors to another, sometimes after spending a number of generations with a very low
average tness. Characterizing all of the ways that this could happen is infeasible, but
in section 6 we will describe one transitory situation, where the population average tness
crashes (drops rapidly to a low value), and the population spends a small number of gener-
ations in a wallower ecology before moving into full nice cooperation.
The observations we present are drawn from one hundred runs of two hundred and fty
generations each of the current IPD/CR simulation system described in this paper, and
several hundred runs of previous implementations both with and without choice and refusal.
5.1 Full Nice Cooperation
A population exhibits full nice cooperation when each individual cooperates in every Pris-
oner's Dilemma game. A player is nice if it cooperates on its rst move. Since all players
maintain an expected payo of three from all other players, partners are always chosen at
random. The play graph of a population characterized by random choice is simply a fully
connected graph that has average and maximum degree equal to twenty-nine and a single
connected component.
At the parameter settings of the current paper, approximately three quarters of the
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simulations end up in full nice cooperation, which tends to persist once it is established.
Usually when invaders appear, the population successfully ostracizes them and maintains
a near three average payo. However, our investigations indicate that no population will
stay in full nice cooperation forever. If followed for a large enough number of generations,
every fully cooperative population will eventually be invaded by less cooperative individuals.
In order for a fully cooperating population to withstand invasion, it needs to very quickly
refuse play from nasty opponents and stick them with low rejection and wallower payos.
Random mutations of the portion of the genome unused by a fully cooperative population
ensures that eventually some portion of the population will lose its ability to protect itself
against defectors. Even defensive structures used during a past incursion of uncooperative
players may be lost if these structures are no longer being used.
Later in section 5.3 we describe a population behavior which causes a peaking in the
population's average payo, but we also see at times a situation where the cooperating
population's payo dips. These dips last longer than the frequent small drops in average
payo caused by random mutants and is caused by a type of player which delays its defection
several moves into cooperating play with other individuals and can avoid receiving very many
rejection payos before the end of the tournament. Because a full nice cooperation population
typically only plays on average 10.2 games between every player, it is possible for a player to
count the approximate end of play between individuals with its Moore machine and defect
on the last few moves. However, as this new player reproduces in future generations, its
success is its demise as there are no longer enough naive cooperators in the population,
the new \delayed defection" players become extinct, and the population returns to full nice
cooperation.
5.2 Latching
The choice and refusal mechanism allows individuals to latch onto other players. A latcher is
a player who repeatedly chooses to play one or possibly a small number of other individuals.
Latching occurs because the expected payo to the latcher from the latchee becomes greater
than it is from the rest of the population and then it stays greater for the majority of
iterations. The play graph of a population of latchers usually has three to twelve components,
an average degree between one and two, and a maximum degree between two and ten. The
distribution of edge weights is such that there are few edges, but existing edges are heavily
weighted with weights around 130{145. An example signicant play graph and ve iteration
snapshot for a population of this type can be seen in Figure 3.
The most common form of a latching population is one in which players initially defect for
one or two moves and then begin cooperating with each other. Take for example a population
of players that have an initial defection followed by cooperation. The Bobs (section 5.3) are
a typical example of such a population. Before any play, the individuals all hold an expected
payo of 
0
= 3 for all other players. Each individual will then choose one player at random
from among this group and a game will be played between those two players. Since both
will defect, each player's expected payo of the other play partner will drop from 3.0 to 2.4.
All individuals which have not played each other yet will still have an expected payo of 3.0
from each other. All players will continue to choose from the set of players they have not yet
played until some individuals have played everyone who will now have an expected payo of
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Figure 3: A population of latchers' signicant play graph for an example generation and a
snapshot from late in the generation. These players have an initial move of defect and then
cooperate. This is from the same run as Figure 5.
2.4 from everyone, and they will make their next player choice at random, both players will
cooperate with each other, and their expected payos from each other will rise above 2.4. At
this point any individual who has already played everyone prefers those it has played twice
to those it has played once, and it will select one of these partners on the next iteration.
Since its estimation of a partner will now continue to grow the more times it plays it, it will
latch onto the player or small set of players it has played the most times.
Interestingly, the random selection process at the beginning, together with the fact that
those who have not yet played everyone will prefer those they have never played to those
they have ever played, implies that all players will not reach the point of being ready to latch
onto a fellow player at the same iteration. Because of this, players who nish earlier will
latch onto other members of the population and once their latchees have played all players
once they will prefer their latcher(s) to all others rather than choosing their next partner
at random. This leads to a very dierent network structure than if everyone were to select
a partner at random and then stick with that partner choice. 100 runs of a pure latching
population of 30 individuals and a population which latches onto the rst partner selected
gave the results in Figure 4. These results look dierent than the observed number of 3-
12 components in the IPD/CR simulations because those populations often contain some
mutants who are not pure latchers.
Variations on the above behavior occasionally occur. Table 3 shows a situation we
observed once in which two players play for four iterations by rst playing two defections
each then two cooperations each and on the fth move player A gets a H payo from the
other player and then three iterations later trades attraction back to player B. These players
continue this behavior for all 150 iterations. While the direction of attraction switches
between the two players, they have the same social network structure as the more typical
defect once or twice then cooperate latchers.
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Figure 4: The dierence between a latching population and one with random selection of a
lifetime partner choice. The mean and standard deviation of the latching population were
10.3 and 1.10, and 11.6 and 1.72 for the random latching. One hundred simulations were
conducted of each.
Player A ddccdcccccdccc: : :
Player B ddcccccdcccccd: : :
Table 3: Two players which exhibit a latching behavior by alternating their attractions. The
bold defections show when one player becomes attracted to the other player.
5.3 Raquel and the Bobs
Many populations show a peaking behavior in the population average payo at some point in
their evolution. An example of this peaking behavior is shown in Figure 5. The population
average payo increases over a series of generations until it gets very close to 3.0, and
then drops to 2.7, or lower, in a single generation. When this behavior is observed in the
population average payo, the population structure Ashlock et al. [2] called Raquel and the
Bobs (R&B) is often occuring. Prior to the increase, there are one or more generations of a
typical latching population. At the start of the increasing phase of the population average
payo, the maximumdegree jumps to 27{29, the average degree stays near 1 and the number
of connected components drops to 1{2. The average degree then slowly increases, while the
maximumdegree and number of connected components are roughly constant. When the drop
in average payo occurs the population's statistics return to that of a latching population.
This pattern may occur only once, or it may repeat several times in a row as in Figure 5.
To understand the reasons underlying this behavior, we need to look more closely at the
players and their interactions. R&B is best described as the intertwining of two interaction
patterns that arise from one another repeatedly. This pattern can occur with dierent
individual behaviors, but the general sequence of events is the same.
The Bobs are often a latching population which play an initial defect followed by coop-
eration with each other, but we do see varying types of Bobs populations. For example in
Figure 5, the rst Bobs-like population appears at generation 18, and consists of at least
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Figure 5: The top gure is an example run showing peaking behavior in the population's
average payo. The middle gure is the maximum and average degree of the signicant play
graph. The bottom gure is the number of connected components in the signicant play
graph. Generations 18{75 in this gure show the repeating R&B phenomenon, the rst 18
generations exhibit a common settling down-behavior as the population move away from the
initially randomly-chosen genetic material.
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Figure 6: An observed example of Raquel and the Bobs. The only states of Bob's and
Raquel's automata that are used when they play each other. Note how Raquel diers only
in its start state.
two subgroups with dierent genetic material, one of which is more defecting than the other.
Raquel is a player that always cooperates when it plays another Raquel and is more co-
operative in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma play against a Bob than the Bobs are with each
other.
Bobs populations have the extra property that they can produce a Raquel by either
a single point mutation or crossover which not all latching populations can do, and so
the genetic structure of the Bobs present in the population becomes an important factor.
Figure 6 shows an observed example of how a Raquel can be formed by the point mutation
of the output of the starting state of a Bob. Understanding the formation of a Raquel from
the crossover of two Bobs requires knowledge of the genetic representation of the Moore
machines. A player's bit string begins with four bits that code for the starting state of the
Moore machine. The remaining bits are composed of sixteen regions of nine bits each that
code for each state in the machine (zero through fteen). One observed example of Raquels
via crossover came from a population that contained two types of Bobs which diered not
in their expressed behaviors with each other or Raquel but in their genetics. Type A had
its start state bits pointing to state nine and type B used state two as the start state.
Interestingly, the type B's states nine through fteen coded for a Raquel if state nine was
considered the start state. Thus out of the one hundred forty-eight total bits, there existed
a contiguous, eighty-one bit region in which crossover could occur between these two types
of Bobs and allow a Raquel to be born.
Since whenever a Bob rst plays Raquel it attains a high successful defection payo of
5, the Bob's expected payo from Raquel goes from 3 to 3.6, and Raquel's expected payo
from the Bob drops from 3 to 2.1. Raquel has made the Bob fall in \love" with it via its
altruistic move and the Bob latches. Driven by its disappointment at the low payo score
it achieves from each initial encounter, Raquel in turn cycles through the Bobs seeking a
suitable Prisoner's Dilemma game partner. In this way all Bobs eventually encounter and
latch onto Raquel. Note that since a Bob only defects against Raquel once, Raquel will never
reject the \obsessed" Bob. After the initial defection against Raquel, the Bobs cooperate
with Raquel.
Despite the initial low payo received from each Bob, Raquel recoups its losses by receiv-
ing a large number of cooperation payos, getting an average of nearly 3. The Bobs actually
fare worse on average, for during the time it takes them to discover Raquel, they are defect-
18
ing with one another. Raquel gets n   1 defections, one from each Bob, and then gets one
cooperation per iteration per Bob on every iteration after the Bob's initial defection. Since
Bobs play roughly two games each round (the one they choose and the one that chooses
them) it takes roughly 7 games for each Bob to nd Raquel in our 30 player simulations.
With 150 iterations this means the tness of a Bob is about
151+1433
157
' 2:83 while Raquel's
tness is
290+142293
29+14229
' 2:99. Raquel therefore usually receives the highest average payo in
this population and thus one of the highest probabilities of being selected as a parent.
Within a few generations there are multiple Raquels. In Figure 5, the rst Raquel is born
in generation 20, the second Raquel is born in generation 22, and by generation 28 there are
6 Raquels. The changing social networks for these populations are illustrated in Figure 7.
When multiple Raquels exist in the population, the Bobs quickly nd all of them and then
cycle through them, while the Raquels choose each other. Now the number of times each
Bob plays each Raquel is fewer than with only one Raquel in the population. This lowers the
average payo score attained by each Raquel. Conversely, each Bob now spends less time
nding the Raquels, which increases its average payo score.
Herein lie the seeds of Raquel's destruction. As the number of Raquels in the population
increases, the average payo score of the population tends to rise, but the average payo
score of a Raquel keeps falling relative to the average payo score of a Bob. Eventually a
point is reached where the Raquels score lower than the Bobs (and the Bobs score fabulously
well, sometimes, as in generation 28, enough to give a population average greater than 3).
This point usually occurs when there are less than 10 Raquels and elitism ensures that all
Raquels die out in the genetic step, although sometimes one or two Raquels remain and
the growth and decay reoccurs immediately. Otherwise the next population consists only of
Bobs.
Figure 7 shows the birth to death cycle from the social net perspective. A population with
multiple Bobs and a single Raquel forms a \star" social network with each Bob connected
only to Raquel at the center. This network is a singly connected component and has a
maximum degree of 29 and a low average degree. The signicant play graph shows that
Raquel indeed outscored all of the Bobs. As multiple Raquels are born, each Bob is connected
to all the Raquels, and the Raquels are connected to each other. The Raquels continue to
outscore many of the Bobs, but the dierence decreases as the number of Raquels increases.
The number of connected components stays one, unless a mutant appears which is unable to
play well with anyone and is ostracized. The maximum degree stays 28{29, but the average
degree goes up until the population suddenly collapses and loses all its Raquels.
In many of our runs the R&B cycle reoccurs one or many times. The average payo
scores achieved by this succession of populations exhibit persistent spikes as the Raquels
emerge, increase, decline to oblivion, and emerge once again. In the case of Figure 5 Raquels
reappear again in generations 34 and 56, but in this particular run, after generation 63
the Raquels never again appeared and by generation 80 this population was in full nice
cooperation. We have also observed cases where R&B reoccurs many more times than this.
Another interesting phenomenon is that by generation 40 the Bob population is behav-
iorally uniform, with all Bobs playing a defect followed by cooperation with one another.
We conjecture that the spikes in scores and the sharp shifts in population behavior act to
eliminate individuals who behave dierently from the most successful individuals, and hence
help stabilize the population.
19
Figure 7: The social networks for the Raquel and the Bobs of Figure 5. From left to right
and top to bottom: (1) The latching network of the Bobs population in generation 19 just
prior to the birth of the rst Raquel. (2) The rst Raquel is born in generation 20 and all
of the Bobs choose it. At 2.979, Raquel has the highest tness. (3) Two generations later a
second Raquel appears, plus one mist. The Bobs like each of the Raquels equally well and
the Raquels choose each other. Both Raquels outscore all the Bobs. (4) A snapshot from
generation 27 with two Raquels, showing how the interactive visualization places them at
the center of the net. (5) In generation 28 there are 6 Raquels, and the tness of the Bobs
rises above theirs (and even above 3). (6) The Raquels have died out and the population
has returned to latching.
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5.4 Codependent Populations
In codependent populations two genetically dierent subpopulations arise and interact with
each other. The subpopulations are codependent because the tness of one population
increases as the size of the other population increases. This increase in tness leads to an
increase in that subpopulations' size and thus to a decrease in its tness. Thus the number
of individuals in each subpopulation oscillates back and forth somewhat like a predator-
prey cycle. We have coined the term codependent because this case is more benign than
predator-prey since both subpopulations do better when there are more of the other. Often
codependent populations are extremely stable against invasion from their own ospring,
perhaps as stable as cooperating populations, and they sometimes persist until the end of
the simulation. We see two distinct types of codependent populations: one which looks
like disconnected stars and one which looks like a central connected group surrounded by
individuals each connected to one of the central individuals.
5.4.1 Disconnected Stars
Disconnected stars, or stars for short, are caused by the interactions of two subpopulations,
hubs and spokes, which stay in equilibrium with each other for many generations. Figures 8
and 9 show this pattern for an example run in which stars appeared. The signicant play
graph of a star population consists of disconnected groups, each of which has a single center
individual (a hub) to which all of the other individuals in the group are connected, and
several (usually 3{7 ) outside individuals (the spokes) who are not connected to each other.
The play graph thus looks like disconnected stars, or hubs with spokes. The number of
hubs and spokes tends to oscillate up and down somewhat, and the exact balance depends
upon the play behaviors of the two. Roughly speaking, star populations are characterized
by a moderate average payo which stays between 2.4 and 2.7 as the balance between the
two populations shifts, 1{8 connected components, and a low average (1{3) and moderate
maximum degree (5{19). These global measures are similar in behavior to that of a latching
population, although stars tend to have slightly fewer connected components and a slightly
greater gap between the maximum and average degree. As well, if only a single hub happens
to be present for several generations, which may, for example, occur if the original population
was a latching population and a hub was born, then the play graph will temporarily look
the same as that of a R&B population. These similarities make an algorithm for automatic
population classication dicult to develop based on only these measures.
There are many individual behaviors which lead to the formation of stars. What is
necessary is that the hubs, while being nice at rst, eventually retaliate against the spokes.
As well, the hubs are not nice to each other. Table 4 shows the interactions of the individuals
in the population of Figures 8{9 with each other.
Given the parameters of the problem, the spokes then always prefer a hub which they
have played once (and for whom the minimumexpected payo is 2.52) to another spoke which
they have also only played once (expected payo 2.4). The hubs will end up preferring spokes
to other hubs because of the one high payo they get from them. The hits that the hubs
take, and their choice behavior, together ensure that the spokes end up preferring one hub
over the other and do not alternate between them.
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Star behavior is often not as clearcut as R&B. Sometimes some of the spokes are playing
each other as well as the hubs. This decreases the number of connected components. As
well, often the hubs are not all identical.
5.4.2 Connected Centers
This case is similar to that of disconnected stars, except that the centers, who we shall
refer to as the nice guys, always cooperate with each other, and thus like each other. This
creates a signicant play graph with a completely connected central subpopulation and a
second subpopulation, referred to as the thugs, whose individuals are each connected only
to a single node in the central group. Except when an occasional mutant is present, the
signicant play graph is a single connected component, with a maximum degree oscillating
around 10{15 and an average degree of 3{5.
These populations have the interesting property that the nice guys would be better o
without the presence of the thugs, who are taking advantage of them, and yet they cannot do
without them once they are present. An example of the interactions between the individuals
in this population with each other are described by Table 5. The nice guys cooperate. When
a thug plays a nice guy, it initially falls in love, but when the nice guy replies with defection,
the thug looks to players with higher expected payos. The thug will reach a point where
all the other thugs have an expected payo of 2.4, and the nice guys will have an expected
payo of 2.82, and thus the thug will next choose a nice guy whose expected payo to the
thug will rise to 2.874 and cause the thug to latch. The nice guy only chooses to play other
nice guys, but can never refuse the latching thugs.
The interactions of this connected centers population can best be seen by looking at a
specic example from an IPD/CR run. The two subpopulation sizes over 250 generations,
and a signicant play graph from a single generation are pictured in Figure 10.
Even though the nice guys would, by themselves, form a fully cooperating population,
once the two behaviors are mixed together they form a long-term relationship from which
the nice guys cannot easily escape. Note from Figure 10 that the more latchers on a nice
guy, the higher its average score. This is because the extended cooperation balances the
initial loss of points. A nice guy therefore depends on having thugs latch onto it in order to
outscore the other nice guys. The more nice guys and fewer thugs, the better o a thug is,
for the thug only reaps benets from nice guys and loses points to other thugs. Thugs score
higher as the number of nice guys in the population increases. Thugs thus start to displace
nice guys from the population, but then their success drops and the number of nice guys
eventually starts to increase. This creates a cycling in the composition of the population
between nice guys and thugs, both of which depend on each other. This population behavior
is similar to a predator prey relationship, except for the twist that, so long as nice guys exist,
nice guys need to have thugs latch onto them in order to survive. Individuals who do not
play one of the two strategies tend to do poorly, and invasion is generally prevented.
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Figure 8: This collection of gures shows a run, minus mutants, which for all practical
purposes reaches full nice cooperation early on and then goes into connected centers and
then into stars behavior around generation 72. The connected centers population involves
more defecting behavior than the example given in section 5.4.2. The run at times begins
to exhibit more cooperative behavior, such as around generation 239, which is evidenced by
the increase in the population's average payo. The high peaks in maximum degree late in
the run occured when there was temporarily only one hub and thus a single star.
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Figure 9: The stars nets. Notice how increasing number of stars \hub centers" only equalizes
the tness of the two types of individuals unlike Raquel and the Bobs where increasing
numbers of Raquels cause Raquels' tnesses to decrease at the expense of Bobs.
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Figure 10: Plots from the sample connected centers population behavior described in the
text. The upper right gure is of the population's signicant play graph statistics. The lower
left plot is of the number of nice guys, and thugs in the population v. generation, and the
right gure is a sample signicant play graph. The population of Nice Guys vs. Thugs mirror
each other, i.e. as one goes up in size the other goes down in size. Note in the signicant
play graph that there is a group of eight players (nice guys) who all play each other and they
each have varying numbers of thugs latched onto them. The cooperators which have more
thugs latched on score higher.
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Figure 11: The population average payo for the wallower crash example given in sec-
tion 6.1. The subsequent rise to cooperation is shown in Figure 12.
6 Crashes
Almost all of the IPD/CR populations run at the parameter settings of this paper, given in
Table 1, evolve to have average tnesses over 2.4 within a few generations, and then stay
above this level. As we have noted earlier in the paper, populations often evolve which appear
to be stable. However, evolution is always at work, and even fully cooperative populations can
never be truly stable. While usually the transition out of a particular population behavior
causes at worst a small shift downward in the population average of the average payo,
sometimes evolution causes a dramatic crash in this average payo, and within one or two
generations it drops more than half a point and stays down for several generations. These
crashes appear to happen for reasons which are population specic, and the composition of
the population may or may not be completely changed afterward. Below we describe an
extinction and the resulting climb back out of a crash.
6.1 Wallower
In the most dramatic of the crashes the population becomes a wallower population. In a
wallower population every individual defects so much that everyone nds everyone else to
be intolerable well before the end of the 150 iterations. Ideally, we would like the social
network of this population to be a completely disconnected graph with no players connected
to any other players. While it is true that everyone in most cases of a wallower population
plays everyone else equally (usually exactly four times at these parameter settings), the
length of interaction is usually so short that it does not count as signicant play relative to
the number of iterations. The method we use to threshold the weighted play graph usually
calculates the correct social network (completely disconnected) but sometimes when there is
a single more cooperative mutant present it fails and produces a fully connected graph. The
characteristic very low, at, behavior of the average payo in a wallower population often
precludes the need to look at the social network.
At these parameter values, wallower populations do not last for many generations.
Figure 12 shows the evolution of cooperation after a wallower crash. The crash is caused
by the extinction of ve Raquel-like players at the end of generation 13. In generation 17,
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an individual is born that, after a few initial defections, can cooperate for the rest of the
generation with one of the existing members of the population. In generation 18, the older
of this pair has a child, that plays with the newer one in the same way as its parent. In
generation 19, a player is born who is not only a nice cooperator with its parent, but who
can also elicit cooperation with other members of the population. Both the latchers and the
latchees do better than the rest of the population. In generation 20, a central group of three
cooperators exists. The latchers are of two varieties. The rst type alternates play between
two cooperators, and the second type latches on, trades defections, and then cooperates.
In generations 21{24, the more cooperative latchers beat out the other latchers, and the
number of cooperative center players continues to grow. In generation 25, we see a large
cluster of cooperators ostracizing some defectors. By generation 26 (not pictured), the entire
population exhibits full nice cooperation.
7 Frequency of Population Behaviors
Our analyses of individual population behaviors in the previous two sections do not give
any sense of how frequently each of the behaviors is observed. We have attempted to use
our observations about the signicant play graphs of our populations to develop automatic
classication schemes, with very little success. As noted throughout our results section,
there is signicant overlap between the global statistics of each of the major population
types. However, examining the distributions of the graph measures of the signicant play
graphs gives some sense of the frequency of dierent net structures. Figure 13 shows these
distributions for the 100 simulations run for this paper. The results from the most common
population behavior, full cooperation, are shown as dashed lines. Populations with a single
component are the most common, even in populations which are not fully cooperative (both
connected centers and Raquel and the Bobs populations tend to have a single component),
large numbers of components are rare (even wallower populations with 30 components are
fairly uncommon), and there is a small peak centered at ten, due to the latching and stars
populations. Notice that there is a gap in the average degree. Populations either have high
or low degree. We can speculate that the peaks in the maximum degree are from latching at
3, from stars and connected centers at 13, and at 30 from R&B and full nice cooperation.
8 Non-Mutual Cooperation
Angeline [1] recently reported on a study in which he relaxed the (L+H)=2 < C constraint
on the payos in the Prisoner's Dilemma payo matrix. With (L+H)=2 > C, the best payo
is still obtained by defecting against a cooperating opponent, and the dilemma still exists.
However, now players who alternate defections and cooperations with each other achieve
a higher average payo than cooperation alone could produce. Now the truly cooperative
action is to alternate defection and cooperation. It has been suggested that this is similar
to a couple deciding that one would work while the other went to graduate school and
then they would trade o again, with the end result being higher than if they had both
simply continued in their present roles of simple cooperation. However, in order to alternate
27
Figure 12: The evolution of cooperation after a wallower crash. From right to left and from
top to bottom: the generations described in section 6.1.
28
110
100
1000
10000
100000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
N
um
be
r o
f G
en
er
at
io
ns
Average Degree of Significant Play Graph
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
N
um
be
r o
f G
en
er
at
io
ns
Maximum Degree of Significant Play Graph
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
N
um
be
r o
f G
en
er
at
io
ns
Number of Components in Significant Play Graph
Figure 13: The distribution of graph metrics for 100 runs of 250 generations each. The
dashed lines represent the full cooperation populations. A population was considered to be
a full cooperation population if it had an average payo greater than 2.88, average degree
greater than 27, maximum degree greater than 27, and number of components less than or
equal to three.
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defections and cooperations, and be successful, players have to coordinate their actions over
consecutive moves.
Angeline ran 10 runs of 200 generations with a population size of 100. Each player
played a 100 iteration Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with each of the other 99 players using
the payo matrix in Figure 1 with H = 7 instead of 5. A player's tness was its average
cumulative score over the 99 games. After an initial dip the average payo across the 10
runs rose and at about the 75th generation settled down to an average around 3. Eight of
his tens runs resulted in populations in which non-mutual cooperation dominated play.
Note that, for the types of nite state machines used by Angeline and in this paper, in
order for non-mutual cooperation to arise it requires the coexistence of at least two dierent
types of players in the population. It is not possible for a player to achieve non-mutual
cooperation with a player identical to itself. But this means that in round robin Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma, as in Angeline, the players that are identical to each other have to
nd a way to cooperate with each other and even when they succeed in repeated mutual
cooperation they must be content with the lower C payo. In our recreations of Angeline's
simulations we found that the population often solves this problem by evolving into a number
of subtypes which works to minimize the number of times individuals must use mutual in
place of non-mutual cooperation. A subtype is considered to be a group of individuals with
the same behavior. There exists a mix of subtypes with some having an initial move of
cooperate (\nice" players) and others with defect as the initial move (\nasty"). When nice
players play nasty players, they most often enter into immediate non-mutual cooperation
of the type observed by Angeline (CDCD, DCDC). When two nice players play each other,
they play the intial cooperate and then usually enter into a series of defections against each
other, and if the players are dierent subtypes, then one will in a few moves play a cooperate
against the other's defect. When this (CD,DC) event occurs, it triggers the players to enter
into a non-mutual cooperation cycle. The dierent nice subtypes have varying lengths of
defect moves after the intial cooperation. If both nice players play a cooperate after the
series of defections, then they enter into mutual cooperation. The same process is used by
nasty subtypes. Once again in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma simulation without choice and
refusal, we see the use of the handshake/password mechanismmentioned in the introduction,
but it relies on the long length of interaction between players.
When we did one hundred runs of IPD/CR at the standard parameters (Table 1) but
set H = 7 as Angeline did, non-mutual cooperation immediately evolved in all but one run.
In these runs, we saw two types of players which produced social nets similar to the one
in Figure 14. We also saw a cycling of the numbers and amount of initial defectors and
initial cooperators. In Figure 14 it can be easily seen that the population has two types of
players present. The players with the lower scores around 3.1 are initial cooperators while
the higher scoring players are initial defectors. Notice that the initial cooperators were the
highest scorers in the previous generation as their position in the circle denotes. Two of the
players' nite state machines can be seen in Figure 15. This cycling occurs because there is
a conict present when two strategies which play non-mutual cooperation coexist, since one
strategy starts with a defection and the other starts with a cooperation. In IPD/CR the
number of games any two pair plays is variable. If the length of interaction isn't an even
number the initial defector has an advantage against the initial cooperator. Also, the initial
defector possibly has an advantage against mutants. On the other hand, the initial defectors
30
Figure 14: A social net showing non-mutual cooperation.
tend to take more mutual defection hits o of each other, especially as their population size
increases.
9 Future Ideas
The use of ideas from social networks and graph theory has given us a wealth of insight
into the behavior of IPD/CR populations and the connection between individual actions
and global societal properties. However, at the moment this analysis relies upon careful
examination of the plots of the average tness and signicant play graph from each run,
and, for noncooperative populations, visually examining the networks as the simulation runs.
We would like to develop more automatic classication schemes which will give us statistics
on the frequency of dierent population behaviors and alert us when novel phenomena are
observed. This will be especially important for larger and more complex populations. Part
of what is observable to the human eye is the time-dependence of the patterns in both the
global statistics and the snapshots. Incorporating ideas about time-dependent graphs may
help us with this latter problem. As well, the human eye can discern spatial patterns which
are not obvious in the statistics. As we examine modications to IPD/CR, we would like
ideally to have tools which are not specic to the currently observed population behaviors
which will allow us to automatically discern recurring patterns. We believe that tools of this
nature are needed for articial life multiagent systems in general, since one of the limits on
using articial life to model real-world biology is the diculty of recognizing useful patterns.
In all studies of IPD/CR to date, we have used a single population in which all players
have the potential to interact with all other agents. This seems reasonable when the pop-
ulation is small. However, in most populations individuals do not interact with all other
individuals. Often there is some kind of spatial structure, and individuals interact only with
those individuals they encounter. In territorial animal populations, these may be nearest
neighbors, but in many populations interactions occur in groups, and individuals may move
between groups. We plan to explore the impact of dierent spatial structures on the behavior
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Figure 15: Two Moore machines from the non-mutual cooperative population shown in
Figure 14. The dotted states represent states in the genetic code but they are unreachable
by any input combination. The left gure shows the structure of the initial cooperator with
a payo of 3.147 in Figure 14. The right gure shows the structure of the initial defector
with a payo of 3.667 in Figure 14.
of IPD/CR.
The partner selection mechanism in IPD/CR is a strong determinant of the individual's
behaviors. We have used expected payos, with exact ordering of potential partners, and a
sharp tolerance cuto. In Ashlock et al. [2] we presented preliminary results on the impact
of allowing two of the parameters,  and !, to evolve along with the nite state machines.
These simulations indicated that many of the same social networks continue to emerge, and
wallower ecologies are very common. We plan to take this work further, allowing all of the
choice parameters to evolve. However, it may be the hard cutos which allow such interesting
behaviors as Raquel and the Bobs and Stars to emerge. Our individuals can distinguish
between individuals with any tiny dierence in expected payos, down to machine-precision.
What happens if there is some fuzziness in their decisions, and individuals only use their
expected payos to determine the probability of choosing or rejecting another individual?
We will examine this issue in a number of dierent ways, for example by assuming that there
is some noise involved in evaluating the expected payos.
IPD/CR was developed as a toy model which could be compared to existing results on
prisoner's dilemma. It has yielded a rich variety of interesting results, but it is important to
keep in mind that it does not model any particular system. In order to move a step closer
to the real world, we plan to give individuals unique markers so that individuals can die and
be born at random times, instead of in discrete generations, and preexisting individuals can
retain their memory of each other. We also plan to give individuals visible markers, which
evolve along with their strategies, which others can use to assess their \attractiveness" as
partners even when they are strangers.
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10 Conclusion
IPD/CR allows the formation of self-organizing social networks among selsh players. A
wide variety of population structures evolve in our IPD/CR simulations, many of which
have distinctive social network structures which arise from interesting interactions between
individuals. The play graph is an eective tool for the quick diagnosis of these population
behaviors when used in conjunction with other population statistics and visualization of
the system. In this paper we have focussed on a subset of populations which have clear,
distinct, social network structures, and which frequently occur for the particular IPD/CR
environment of this paper. Table 6 summarizes their signicant play graph statistics. These
behaviors are not the only ones observed for the IPD/CR environment of Table 1, but they
are prevalent in most of the IPD/CR environments we have studied in previous papers.
The signicant play graph adds important information about the social behaviors of
our system. However, the statistics we are currently collecting about these play graphs are
not sucient for us to automatically classify populations. This is partly a measure of the
crudeness of these measures, and partly a reection of the inadequacy of the concept of a
static combinatorial graph. Not only do populations temporarily exhibit dierent behaviors
because of mutants who survive for only brief periods of time, but even a single generation
of IPD/CR play can be extremely complex with waves of rejection and momentary attacks
on certain players. We have restricted our discussion in this paper primarily to populations
which form their nal social networks early in the generation, largely because populations
which shift networks later in the generation are rare. However, they do arise, and as we
develop more realistic models we will need to have ways of measuring and classifying more
complex behaviors.
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Hub cdcd: : : Hub cdccc: : : Spoke dcdc: : :
Hub cdcd: : : Spoke ddccc: : : Spoke dcdc: : :
Table 4: The behaviors of the example disconnected stars run described in section 5.4.1.
Nice guy ccccc: : : Nice guy cdccc: : : Thug dcccc: : :
Nice guy ccccc: : : Thug ddccc: : : Thug dcccc: : :
Table 5: From the example run discussed in the text, this table shows the behaviors of the
two types of players in a connected centers population.
Components Average Degree Maximum Degree General Population Behavior
1 29 29 Full Cooperation
3{12 1{2 2{10 Latching
1 1{4 27{29 Raquel & the Bobs
1{8 1{3 5{9 Disconnected stars
1{2 3{5 10{15 Connected Centers
30 0 0 Wallower
Table 6: Summary of general characteristics for the thresholded undirected play graph. Note
that the numbers are only approximations.
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